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Abstract
The growth in labor market participation among women with young children has
raised concerns about the potential negative impact of the mother’s absence from
home on child outcomes. Recent data show that mother’s time spent with children
has declined in the last decade, while the indicators of children’s cognitive and noncog-
nitive outcomes have worsened. The objective of our research is to estimate a model
of the cognitive development process of children nested within an otherwise standard
model of household life cycle behavior. The model generates endogenous dynamic in-
terrelationships between the child quality and employment processes in the household,
which are found to be consistent with patterns observed in the data. The estimated
model is used to explore the eﬀects of schooling subsidies and employment restrictions
on household welfare and child development.
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11 Introduction
Economic theory does not provide unambiguous predictions regarding the impact of parental
employment on the welfare of children. While family income is necessary to provide for the
public and private consumption of the household and its members, as well as for invest-
ments undertaken collectively and individually, there are opportunity costs associated with
time supplied to the labor market beyond the foregone leisure of the parents. As discussed
below, numerous studies have found a positive relationship between the time spent with
parents and the quality of a child's outcomes, measured on any of one of several dimensions.
The nature of the tradeo facing household decision-makers is apparent if we think of the
household as an enterprise with a complicated set of preferences, outputs, and constraints,
as in the seminal work of Becker (1981). From a societal perspective, perhaps the most
important output of the household is the number and the \quality" of children it produces.
It is helpful to think of there being a production technology for child quality, in which some
initial endowment of child quality at birth is augmented during the development process
by inputs of time contributed by parents, siblings, other relatives, paid child-care workers,
teachers, etc., and by various types of goods in the market, such as formal schooling, toys,
books, sporting goods, etc. Given the household's objectives, its mode of decision-making,
and the constraints it is confronted with over time, it makes a sequence of time allocation,
consumption, and investment decisions at each stage of the child development process.
Ignoring the possibility of borrowing and saving for the moment, the more income the
household has at a point in time, the more can be spent on child investment goods, among
other things. By the same token, decreasing time with the child, holding other inputs
xed, leads to worse child quality outcomes. How does the household properly balance
these trade-os?
It may be useful to compare and contrast the situation that prevails in the stan-
dard prot-maximizing rm. In this case, rm behavior is decomposed into a (1) cost-
minimization problem, which yields a function that provides the minimum cost required to
produce any level of output, and (2) a prot-maximization problem in which the cost func-
tion is considered as being predetermined. The solution of these two sequential problems
yields the prot-maximizing output quantity and the demand for the factors of production.
This is all reasonably straightforward.
In the case of child quality, we face a number of additional challenges, some of them
nicely described in Todd and Wolpin (2004). The production process is truly dynamic in
the case of child quality, with input decisions from past years typically inuencing current
investment choices and child quality levels. Unlike the case of the rm, whose objective
is to choose output levels so as to maximize prots, the objectives of the parents are not
dened only with respect to the quality, or the quantity, of their children. Their utility
levels also are determined by their leisure, their consumption of adult private goods, and
public goods that aect the welfare of all members of the household. In other words, the
household's objective is not to maximize child quality given the resources available to them.
2Our focus is on the estimation of child outcome technologies, or production functions,
that include as arguments a limited number of (potentially observable) factors of produc-
tion, as well as functions characterizing the dynamic evolution of the budget constraint of
the household. Given the arguments we have just presented, it appears necessary to model
the household decision-making process in a relatively complete way if we are to disentangle
the impact of household preferences, technologies, and constraints on child quality out-
comes. Our model utilizes a reasonably standard life cycle framework, in which parents
face partially endogenous constraint sets that evolve over time.The Child Development
Supplements of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, hereafter referred to as the PSID-
CDS, gives us a substantial amount of useful information, but only at one or two points
in time. The keys to being able to use such limited (in a dynamic sense) information to
estimate a growth model are (1) assuming age-invariance or parametric age-dependence
of the functions and processes describing the households' objectives and constraints and
(2) the use of simulation-based estimation techniques that allow us to \ll in" the large
numbers of gaps we face in our data on the development process at the household level.
Even under the restrictive assumptions made for purposes of tractability and for pa-
rameter identication, we nd that we are able to t many of the patterns observed in the
empirical household income, labor supply, child investment, and child outcome processes
reasonably well. Using the parameter estimates, we are able to analyze the impact of
changes in the time inputs of mothers and fathers on the child development process. Of
course, both of these processes are endogenous within the model, so that any changes in the
relationship between them must be produced by changes in the parental wage and nonlabor
income processes and the prices of the consumption and investment goods. The model is
able to generate a number of behavioral links between the child quality and employment
processes in the household, which we believe shed some light on dynamic relationships
observed in the raw data and the possible impacts of labor market shocks to the parents
on the welfare of their children.
There exists a large empirical literature on the relationship between household charac-
teristics, parental employment patterns, and child outcomes, and in section 2 we provide
a brief survey. In section 3 we present the model, and section 4 contains a discussion of
estimation issues, the data utilized in the empirical work, and some descriptive empirical
results. Section 5 contains the model estimates, and some \empirical" comparative statics
exercises. In section 6 we conduct two highly stylized policy experiments, primarily in
order to illustrate the potential usefulness of the modeling approach taken in the paper to
addressing policy issues. Section 7 concludes.
32 Previous Research on the Determinants of Child Devel-
opment
There is an extensive literature in economics on parental and public investment in children
and children's outcomes. Recent surveys have shown that children's cognitive and non
cognitive outcomes are largely determined early in life (Carneiro and Heckman 2003,Er-
misch and Francesconi 2005). Inputs applied by families as well as other environmental
factors during the early childhood play a very signicant role in later cognitive, social, and
behavioral outcomes. Several papers have examined this relationship. Todd and Wolpin
(2007) estimate a dynamic child quality production function that views child development
as a cumulative process, with the nal child quality level being determined by the sequence
of family and school inputs supplied during the developmental process and on heritable
endowments (i.e., initial conditions). Their estimating framework allows for unobserved
endowment eects, potentially endogenous input choices, and for the cumulative eects
of child investments. Their results show that both contemporaneous and lagged inputs
matter in the production of current achievement, and that it is important to allow for
unobserved child-specic endowment eects and the endogeneity of inputs. Cunha and
Heckman (2008) and Cunha, Heckman, and Schenach (2010) estimate a dynamic factor
model of child cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes in a model of skill formation, taking
into account the problem of endogeneity of inputs and the unobserved nature of both the
inputs and outputs. They nd that early environments play a large role in shaping later
outcomes, and children's cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes are largely determined early
in life.
Our research builds on these previous studies by jointly estimating the production tech-
nology of child development within an explicit model of household choices. This strategy
accomplishes the goal of \correcting" for the endogeneity of inputs in the estimation of
the production technology, as in the work by Todd and Wolpin and Cunha et al., but also
allows us to estimate the household preferences that lead to these input decisions, albeit
with explicit assumptions about the model of the household. This allows us to conduct
more realistic policy experiments by manipulating the time and budget constraints the
household faces (e.g. income transfers) in order to understand how households adjust their
input choices to changes in the policy environment and how this ultimately aects the
child development process. A limitation of our approach relative to Cunha et al is that
we consider only household investments in cognitive development, as in the work of Todd
and Wolpin, rather than both non-cognitive and cognitive development as in Cunha et
al. (2010) However, in contrast to the work of Cunha et al, which considers only a single
child investment good, households in our model make a number of specic input choices,
ranging from dierent time inputs to child good expenditures, each with a dierent time
varying productivity. Our model of the household then allows us to incorporate directly a
rich variety of household level data, including parental labor supply, wages, and non-labor
4income, and relate these data to the child development process. This approach is related to
the work of Bernal (2008). She estimates a dynamic model of mothers' choices to control
for potential biases that may arise as a result of the fact that women who work and use
child care may be systematically dierent from women who do not, as well as allowing for
the child's initial cognitive ability to inuence the mother's work decisions. In contrast
to Bernal, our work involves a richer set of household choices, including continuous labor
supply, time, and expenditure choices of both mothers and fathers.
A large number of studies have assessed the eect of parental time on children's cognitive
development. Most studies have used parents' employment as a proxy for time with the
children. These studies report evidence that, on the negative side, the loss of parental
time with the children has a negative impact on certain measures of the child's well-being
(e.g. socio-emotional adjustment and cognitive outcomes), while, on the positive side, the
additional labor income has positive implications for expenditures on goods consumed by
the child (Brooks-Gunn, Han and Waldfogel, 2001; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2005; Bernal,
2008). It remains unclear which eect is predominant, since the existing literature provides
conicting conclusions. There is wide variation in reported empirical estimates, even for
studies based on the same data set. Estimates range from parental employment being
detrimental (Baydar and Brooks-Gunn,1991; Desai et. al., 1989), to its having no eect
(Blau and Grossberg, 1992), to its being benecial (Vandell and Ramanan, 1992). Reasons
for the diversity of these results may include the wide range of specications that are
estimated, as well as the common limitation of failing to control for potential biases that
may arise due to the endogeneity of parental time and other child quality inputs included
in the analyses.
Most studies limit their attention to mother's inputs. The literature on the eects of
maternal time on child cognitive outcomes is extensive. Some studies have focused on the
timing of the process showing that there are deleterious impacts of maternal employment
during the child's rst year, while the inuence of maternal employment on child outcomes
after the rst year is ambiguous (Baydar and Brooks-Gunn, 1991; Ruhm, 2004). Many
studies have demonstrated that the inuence of maternal employment on child outcomes
diers by the economic and demographic characteristics of mothers and their families,
suggesting that maternal employment may be more harmful for children from advantaged
backgrounds: children from wealthier families, non-Hispanic white children, and children
from intact families. Desai, Chase-Lansdale and Michael (1989) nd that maternal em-
ployment negatively inuences children from higher income families, but not children from
middle or low income families, while Waldfogel, Han and Brooks-Gunn (2002) nd a per-
sistent negative eect of mother's employment on cognitive test scores for non-Hispanic
white children, but not for African-American or Hispanic children.
Very few studies have used direct measures of the time parents spend with children to
examine the relationship between parental investments and children's cognitive develop-
ment. Time diary data suggest that women's entry into the labor force is associated with
changes in time use but employment is not a perfect proxy of time with children. Huston
5and Aronson (2005) nd that a measure of the mother's time with children even relates
negatively to child language skills, though there are obvious reverse causality issues that
may be important. Their studies are limited to the investigation of behaviors and outcomes
in the rst two years of life and do not take into account dierences in the initial endow-
ments of children. More recently, Hsin (2008), using the Child Development Supplement
of the PSID, investigated the eect of maternal time with children during pre-school years
on the child's cognitive outcomes, while conditioning on characteristics of children that
may lead to bias the estimated impact of maternal time allocations. For example, children
clearly dier in their initial endowments such as innate cognitive ability, health status, and
their physical development. Mothers may respond to observed diculties faced by children
by spending more time with them. She nds a positive and persistent eect of the time
mothers spend with children on children's language development, but only among children
who spend time with verbally-skilled mothers.
While mother's time is a crucial input in the production process of child outcomes,
father's time may be equally productive, especially in some stages in the child's development
process; time spent with children by fathers has increased over time, partly osetting the
decline in mother's time spent with the child. Studies considering father's time show that
fathers' care for infants is no better or worse than other types of arrangements (Averett et
al (2005), and the amount of time a father spends with children is aected by the gender
composition of the children (Lundberg et al 2006). Several studies suggest that there is no
long term benet of paternal investments on children's achievement and behavior (Yeung,
Hill, and Duncan,1999; Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).
In addition to the literature on parental time, another literature examines whether
family income inuences child development (see surveys by Mayer 1997, and Almond and
Currie 2010). Despite a large body of evidence documenting the association between family
income and child development, there is much controversy about whether these correlations
can be given causal interpretations. Like the parental time literature, the results in the
family income literature are mixed. Using instrumental variable strategies, the estimates
reported in Dahl and Lochner (2008) suggest some positive eects of family income on
children's (short-run) outcomes and Loken, while Loken (2010) nds little, if any, impact of
family income. Using a sibling dierences in family income to net out permanent dierences
in family environment, Levy and Duncan (2000) nd that family income is important
for children's educational attainment, whereas Blau (1999) nds a small eect of family
income on child outcome. Loken, Mogstad, and Wiswall (2010) show the importance of
model specication as restricted linear models, as estimated previously, may show very
small eects, while non-linear models reveal a concave relationship with stronger eects of
family income on child outcomes for poor families and little eect for richer families, as is
consistent with the theoretical literature (Becker and Tomes 1979).
An important contribution of our research is that we can show the dierent connections
between the level of household income and childhood development. A higher level of family
income does not necessarily indicate a higher level of family resources being provided to
6children. This is because for most households, most income is derived from labor market
participation, and labor supply directly trades o with time spent with children. Parents
with higher levels of income may then be working more in the labor market and providing
lower levels of time investments in their children. This channel may dampen or even
reverse the assumed positive relationship between income and child development. Our
model allows us to examine each of these channels through which family resources and
household decision making aect the production of child outcomes.
3 Model
This section develops the model that is the basis of our empirical estimation. As noted
in the Introduction, the model is based on a set of assumptions that allow us to derive
closed-form solutions to the household's dynamic optimization problem; it is the simple
forms of the life-cycle demand functions that allows us to include a relatively large number
of endogenous variables in a straightforward way. The special characteristics of the decision
rules also allow us to sort out identication issues when we discuss estimation issues in the
following section.
3.1 Timing and Preferences
The model begins with the birth of a child. The household makes decisions in each period of
a child's life, where the child's age is indexed by t. We consider only one child families and
leave for future work extensions of this modeling framework to multiple child households.
Parents make investments in child quality from the rst period of the child's life, t = 1,
through the last developmental period, T. At this \terminal" point (from the perspective of
the parents' investment in the child), the child has reached adulthood and adult outcomes
depend (in part) on the level of child quality obtained at this point.1
In each period, the household makes seven choices: hours of work for each parent: h1t
(mother) and h2t (father); time spent in \active" child care for each parent: 1t (mother)
and 2t (father); time spent in \passive" child care by each parent: z1t and z2t; and expen-
ditures on \child" goods, et. Household utility in period t is a function of each parent's
hours of leisure, l1t for the mother and l2t for the father, the level of a consumption good
produced by the household, ct, and the level of their child's quality, kt. We assume a
Cobb-Douglas form for preferences and restrict the preference parameters to be stable over
time:
1The terminal date T need not correspond to the end of the investment period in the child. In a more
elaborate model of child development, it may correspond to the end of a particular developmental stage,
with the nal value of child quality in the current stage of development serving as an initial condition into
the next stage of development, which may be characterized by very dierent production technologies. While
we have not pursued such an approach in this paper, it is a subject of our on-going research.
7u(l1t;l2t;ct;kt) = 1 lnl1t + 2 lnl2t + 3 lnct + 4 lnkt; (1)
where
P
j j = 1:
3.2 Child Quality Production
Age t + 1 child quality is produced by the current level of child quality, kt, parental time
investments in the child of the active and passive kind, and expenditures on the child, all
of which are made when the child is age t. We assume a Cobb-Douglas form for the child
quality technology:













where Rt > 0 is the scaling factor know as total factor productivity, or TFP.
While the Cobb-Douglas form restricts the substitution possibilities, we allow the pro-
ductivities of the various inputs to vary over the age of the child. This allows us to
capture the important insights in the economics and child development literatures that the
marginal productivity of inputs varies over the stages of child development (for a useful
survey, see Heckman and Masterov (2007)). As written in (2), the production technology is
deterministic. An extension of the model is to assume there are stochastic shocks to child
quality production, which may be attractive for purposes of estimation, though under our
functional form assumptions the presence of such a shock has no substantive impact on
the household's decision rules. We will return to this topic below.
3.3 Dynamic Problem
Given wage oers and the current level of child quality, parents optimally choose their
labor supply and child inputs to maximize expected lifetime discounted utility. The value
function for the household at period t is then
Vt(St) = max
l1t;1t;l2t;2t;;z1t;z2t;et
u(l1t;l2t;ct;kt) + EtVt+1(St+1); (3)
s.t. TT = ljt + hjt + jt + zjt; j = 1;2 (4)
ct + et = w1th1t + w2th2t + It (5)
where the vector of state variables St consist of the current level of child quality, the wage
oers to the parents, and nonlabor income,
St = (kt w1t w2t It);
 (2 [0;1)) is the discount factor, and Et denotes the conditional expectation operator
with respect to the period t information set. The state variable vector at the birth of the
child are the initial conditions of the problem, S1 = (k1 w11 w21 I1).
8The constraint set faced by the household in period t consists of time and market good
expenditures restrictions. We assume that each parent has a time endowment of TT hours,
and that this time is allocated between leisure, market labor supply, active time spent with
the child, and passive time spent with the child. The last constraint is the expenditure
constraint, and its form follows from our assumption that there is no saving and borrowing
and that the prices of ct and et are 1 in every period.
3.4 Terminal Value
Parental investments in child quality are limited to the rst T period's of the child's life.
The terminal level of child quality is then kT+1. Beyond T, the parents make only labor
supply and consumption decisions, since kt = kT+1 for t = T + 1;T + 2;::: Then we can
write the households optimization problem at time T + 1 as





1 lnl1;T+1 + 2 lnl2;T+1 + 3 ln(w1;T+1(TT   l1:T+1) + w2;T+1(TT   l2;T+1) + IT+1)
+Et+1~ VT+2(w1;T+2;w2;T+2;IT+2):
A few things to note about this expression are the following. First, assuming that the
household is innitely-lived,2 the household problem after period T becomes stationary, so
that we can write
~ VT+s(~ ST+s) = ~ V (~ ST+s); s = 1;2;::: ;
where ~ St = (w1t w2t It): Second, we have assumed that the \terminal" value of child quality
in period T +1 is given by  4 lnkT+1: There are at least two ways to view this component
of the household's payo function.
1. If we made the stringent assumption that child quality was xed at kT+1 for the
remainder of the child's life (or at least, the household's view of the child's quality
was xed at kT+1 \forever), then the utility yield to the innitely-lived household
would be
4 lnkT+1 + 4 lnkT+1 + 24 lnkT+1 + ::: = (1   ) 14 lnkT+1;
in which case   = (1   ) 1:
2It is not strictly necessary that the household be innitely-lived. All of the properties discussed follow
if the has a constant probability of death, say , the value of which is subsumed within the discount factor
:
92. Somewhat more realistically, we can think of the quality level kT+1 as being an input,
or serving as an initial condition, into a subsequent development phase of the child,
one in which the household makes no direct money or time investments. We assume
that the expected value of this stream of future quality levels can be represented by
  lnkT+1:
Finally, it is apparent that with no savings or borrowing possibilities and with no state
dependence in wages and/or nonlabor income (i.e., the wage and nonlabor income processes
are strictly exogenous), once the child investment process is nished, the household solves
a sequence of static optimization problems. Thus the period s optimization problem,
s = T + 1;T + 2;:::; reduces to
max
l1;s;l2;s
1 lnl1;s + 2 lnl2;s + 3 ln(w1;s(TT   l1:s) + w2;s(TT   l2;s) + Is):




1 lnl1T + 2 lnl2T + 3 lncT + 4 lnkT
+ 4f1T ln1T + 2T ln2T + 3T lnz1T + 4T lnz2T + 5T lneT + 6T lnkTg
+ET ~ V (~ ST+1)
>From the point of view of the choice problem, we can write this expression as
VT(w1T;w2T;IT;kT) = max
l1T;1T;l2T;2T;z1T;z2T;eT
1 lnl1T + 2 lnl2T + 3 lncT
+ 4f1T ln1T + 2T ln2T + 3T lnz1T + 4T lnz2T + 5T lneTg
+QT(kT; ~ ST+1); (6)
where QT(kT; ~ ST+1) is not a function of any current period choices. Thus the time alloca-
tion and consumption decisions are determined solely from the expression on the rst two
lines of the right hand side of (6).
3.5 Model Solution
We devote some time to describing the solution to the model, which will be important in
understanding the ability of the model to t the data and, more formally, in evaluating the
ability of our proposed estimator to recover the primitive parameters that characterize the
model.
As is clear from the nature of the production technology, there are never any corner
solutions to the household input choice problem during the investment period.3 However,
3If any factor is set at 0, then child quality will be 0 in all subsequent periods, and household utility
diverges to  1 as k ! 0 whenever 4 > 0:
10we do allow for corner solutions in labor supply as labor supply for either or both parents
may be 0 in a given period. We can write the conditional factor demands for child inputs,
where we are conditioning on labor supply choices and nonlabor income, as
1t = (TT   h1t)
'1t
1 + '1t + '3t
(7)
2t = (TT   h2t)
'2t
2 + '2t + '4t
(8)
z1t = (TT   h1t)
'3t
1 + '1t + '3t
(9)
z2t = (TT   h2t)
'4t
2 + '2t + '4t
(10)





'jt = jtt+1; j = 1;:::;5:
The sequence ftgT+1
t=1 is dened (backwards-) recursively as
T+1 =  4
T = 4 + 6;TT+1
. . .
t = 4 + 6;tt+1
. . .
1 = 4 + 6;22:
t is the period t marginal utility of (log) child quality to the household: t = @Vt(St)=@ lnkt.
t reects both the present period ow marginal utility of (log) child quality to the house-
hold, given by 4, and the discounted value of child quality to future utility. The latter
value of current child quality depends on the discount rate and the technologically deter-
mined productivity of the current stock of child quality in producing future child quality,
given by the time varying parameter 4;t.
The solution to the spousal labor supplies problem in period t also has a simple form.










w1tTT(3 + '5t)   (1 + '1t + '3t)It
w1t(1 + 3 + '1t + '3t + '5t)
A2t =
w2t(1 + '1t + '3t)
w1t(1 + 3 + '1t + '3t + '5t)
B1t =
w2tTT(3 + '5t)   (2 + '2t + '4t)It
w2t(2 + 3 + '2t + '4t + '5t)
B2t =
w1t(2 + '2t + '4t)
w2t(2 + 3 + '2t + '4t + '5t)
;
Given these latent labor supplies, we can dene the actual optimal hour choices that
satisfy the rationing constraint on the time allocations of the parents. The solution to the
optimization problem in terms of the \latent" labor supply choices is derived from functions
similar to reaction functions, which express the optimal latent labor supply choice of parent
i as a linear function of the latent labor supply choice of parent i0; i0 6= i: These functions
are
^ h1t = A1t   A2t^ h2t
^ h2t = B1t   B2t^ h1t:
If the latent labor supplies on the right hand sides are set to zero, it is apparent that the
condition required for the conditional latent labor supplies to both be 0 is
(h
1t = 0;h
2t = 0) , A1t  0 and B1t  0:
If both of these intercept terms are nonpositive, then the household supplies no time to
the market. For this to be the case, it is necessary that the household's nonlabor income
be strictly positive.
Going back to the \full" solutions to the model given in (12), if both of the solutions
are positive, then both satisfy the time allocation constraints, and these are the solutions
to the household optimization problem. If the latent labor supply of parent 1 is positive
and that of parent 2 is negative, then (h
1t = A1t;h
2t = 0); while if the situation is reversed,
the solution is (h
1t = 0;h







(0;0) if A1t  0 and B1t  0
(A1t;0) if A1t   A2tB1t > 0 and B1t   B2tA1t < 0
(0;B1t) if A1t   A2tB1t < 0 and B1t   B2tA1t > 0
(^ h1t;^ h2t) if A1t   A2tB1t  0 and B1t   B2tA1t  0
Using these optimal labor supply choices, the investment decisions are determined using
(7);(8);(9);(10); and (11) after substituting h
1t and h
2t into the functions.
123.6 Characteristics of Decision Rules
We conclude this section by discussing a few characteristics of the decision rules derived
under our modeling assumptions. Most notable is the fact that our functional form as-
sumptions result in decision rules that are independent of the current child quality state.
Child quality remains a state variable in the problem since it enters the utility function
of the household in every period. The lack of dependence of investment and labor sup-
ply decisions on child quality levels greatly simplies the computational burden of solving
the model, enabling us to nd closed-form solutions for all seven endogenous variables.
Even though the functional form assumptions are restrictive, it is not necessary to as-
sume temporal invariance of either the child quality production function or of household
preferences. For purposes of estimation and our philosophical bent, we have assumed time-
invariant household preferences, but in principle there is no restriction on the manner in
which the Cobb-Douglas utility function could vary over time. This makes the specica-
tion suciently exible to t most patterns in the data while preserving its very attractive
computational properties.
The model as it has been developed so far does not include \shocks" or uncertainty in
any form. Once again, due to the properties of the decision rules, such \realistic" changes
to the model setup can be easily accommodated. For example, say that the child quality
production function is altered to include a stochastic total factor productivity, that is,













where Rt has a nondegenerate distribution Ht: Then we can write
lnkt+1 = lnRt + 1t ln1t + 2t ln2t + 3t lnz1t + 4t lnz2t + 5t lnet + 6t lnkt + "t; (13)
where "t  lnRt   lnRt and Et lnRt = lnRt, assuming that this expectation exists. No
other restrictions are necessary on the distribution of the sequence flnRtgT
t=1; since the
decision rules are independent of the flnktgT
t=1:
It is also not necessary to assume that the household knows future values of the wage
and nonlabor income process when making period t decisions under our assumption of no
borrowing or saving. Because of this assumption, labor supply decisions were made as if
the model was static in nature. Due to this, future wages or nonlabor income receipts
cannot inuence current period decisions, and all decisions are consistent with various
assumptions about how households form expectations, including perfect foresight, rational
expectations, and adaptive expectations. Given the ability to save and borrow, current
period labor supply decisions will be aected by future wage expectations, and the model
would have to take a stand on how these were formed.
134 Econometric Issues
We now discuss the manner in which we have taken the model developed above to the
data, and we provide some details concerning identication issues. A key element of taking
any model to data is the manner in which heterogeneity is included, if it is included in
the model at all, and the nature of the randomness in the model that is a requirement for
there to exist a well-posed estimation problem.
4.1 Econometric Specication
We begin by discussing some of our assumptions regarding the model specication. As
noted above, we allow the production function parameters to vary with the age of the
child, but do not allow any further heterogeneity in that function. That is, we assume
that all families possess the same child production technology.4 In order to economize on
parameters, we assume that the parameters f1t;2t;3t;4t;5t;6tgT
t=1 vary as follows:
jt = exp(j0 + j1t); j = 1;:::;6; t = 1;:::;T:
Similarly, we assume that TFP, Rt; is given by
Rt = exp(00 + 01t + t);
where t is i.i.d. N(0;2
R): Thus the production process is characterized by 15 parameters,
(fj0;j1g6
j=0;R).
Household preferences are assumed to be xed over time, however, we do allow het-
erogeneity in utility function preferences across households. We specify the distribution of
preferences parameters as G(;); where G is a parametric distribution function character-
ized by the nite-dimensional parameter vector , and with the three dimensional vector
 = (1 2 3)0 dened such that 0 < 1 + 2 + 3 < 1; j > 0; j = 1;2;3: A household
objective is determined by a draw from the distribution G; with 4 = 1   1   2   3:
In terms of the specic functional form for G; we assume that it is generated as follows.
The 3  1 vector  is normally distributed with
  N(;);
where  is a 3  1 vector and
P
 is a 3  3 covariance matrix of full rank. Dene
D = 1 +
P3
j=1 exp(j): Then a draw  from the trivariate normal is mapped into  as
1 = D 1 exp(1)
2 = D 1 exp(2)
3 = D 1 exp(3)
4 = D 1
4Below, we do consider another version of the model where the productivity of each parent's time in
producing child quality is aected by the parent's level of education.
14The c.d.f. of  is given by
G() =
ZZZ
[D 1 exp(1)  1][D 1 exp(2)  2][D 1 exp(3)  3]dF(j;):
Thus the population distribution of  is characterized in terms of the parameter vectors
 and vec(); the vectorization of the nonredunant elements in .5
Next we discuss our specication of the evolution of the wage and nonlabor income pro-






























; for all t
The terms 1;t and 2;t are the means of the log wage draws of the mother (1) and father






jt; j = 1;2;
where sj is the completed schooling level (which is time invariant) of parent j:
In terms of the nonlabor income process, there are a a large number of households with
no nonlabor income in a given period, so we consider this process to be a truncated version
of a latent variable process in levels (instead of logs). In particular, let
I
t = 3;t + "3;t; (14)
be the latent nonlabor income in period t, with a mean given by 3;t and where "3;t
i:i:d: 
N(0;33); t = 2;3;:::. The actual nonlabor income process is given by
It = max(0;I
t ); for all t: (15)
5When estimating , it is necessary to choose a parameterization that ensures that any estimate ^  is
symmetric, positive denite. The most straightforward way of doing so is to use the Cholesky decomposition















where c1;c2;c3 are constrained to be positive using the exponential function, and c12;c13;c23 are constrained
to be between  1 and 1 using the logit function. These constraints ensure that the diagonal elements
are strictly positive and the matrix has proper scaling for the numerical implementation of the Cholesky
decomposition. (see Pinheiro and Bates, 1996).
15Since we found little relationship between the observed characteristics of parents and the
nonlabor income process, 3;t is assumed to be constant across households and over time
in the population.
Note that we have assumed that the wage and nonlabor income processes are inde-
pendently distributed over time. While allowing for dependence in these processes (of the
exogenous type6) is straightforward and does not complicate the solution of the model,
due to the nature of the data available to us we found it impossible to obtain credible
estimates of the parameters characterizing dependence. Over the sample period, the PSID
is administered every two years, while our model is based on annual time periods. Estimat-
ing autocorrelation parameters for a yearly process o of biannual observations leads to a
classic aliasing problem. When we allowed the disturbances in the wage equations to follow
a rst order autoregressive process, point estimates of the autocorrlation parameters where
strongly negative, which we found not to be credible. As a result, we have restricted the
processes to be conditionally independent over time, with all dependence arising through
mean dependence on time-invariant observable heterogeneity.
4.2 Measuring Child Quality
In terms of the deriving the mapping between unobserved (latent) child quality, kt, and
measured child quality, k
t, we proceed as follows. Consistent with prior research on this
subject, we consider child quality to be inherently unobservable to the analyst, though
we do assume that it is observable by household members, as it is a determinant of the
household utility level and is a (potential) input into the decision-making process. In
actuality, most cognitive test scores, such as the one used in the empirical work, are simple
sums of the number of questions answered correctly by the test-taker. If the child of age t
has a quality level of kt; we consider the probability that they correctly answer a question
of diculty d to be
p(kt;d):
It is natural to assume that p is nondecreasing in its rst argument for all d and is nonin-
creasing in its second argument for all kt: We will think of the Letter-Word test used in the
empirical analysis as consisting of equally \dicult" questions, and will drop the argument
d for simplicity.
Given a cognitive ability test consisting of  k items of equal diculty, the number of
correct answers, k
t; is distributed as a Binomial random variable with parameters ( k;p(kt)):
Note that the inherent randomness in the test-taking process ensures that the mapping
between k and k is stochastic. The measurement process implies that a given child of
quality kt has a stochastic probability of answering some number of the questions correctly,
up to the test score ceiling of  k. Our measurement model then achieves two goals: (i) we
6By \nonendogenous," we mean all dependence that is not generated by past household choices, such
as previous labor supply decisions.
16map a continuous latent child quality dened on (0;1) into a discrete test score measure
imposing the measurement oor at 0 and ceiling at  k, and (ii) we allow for the possibility
of measurement error so that a child's score may not perfectly reect her latent quality.
Previous research has often used linear (or log linear) continuous measurement equations
(e.g. Cunha and Heckman 2008). Our approach diers from this in using a measurement
process that explicitly recognizes the discrete and nite nature of the test score measure.
In order to estimate the model, we do have to take a position on the form of the function
p(k): Besides being nondecreasing in k; we would like to have it possess the properties:
limk!0 p(k) = 0 and limk!1 p(k) = 1. We choose the following function that satises
these restrictions as
p(k;) =
exp(0 + 1 lnk)









; 1 > 0:
Unsurprisingly, we will have to restrict the values of 0 and 1 to aid in model identication.
This is discussed in the following section.
For each child we observe two measures of child quality at two dierent ages. We
use the initial measure of child quality as our initial condition. However, to solve the
model, we require an initial level of latent child quality kt, not the measure k
t. We map
the initial measure into the initial latent child quality by assuming that, without previous
observations on the process prior to our initial measure, we have \total ignorance" regarding
a given individuals value of p. We represent our initial prior as a Beta distribution with
parameters (1;1), or which is uniform on [0;1]. We then observe the test score, allowing
us to update our prior and produce a posterior distribution on p, which is also Beta (a
conjugate distribution for the Binomial). The posterior distribution for p is then Beta with
parameters (1 + k
t;( k   k
t) + 1), where k
t is the number of correct answers out of the
 k = 57 items.
From the posterior distribution of p, Beta(1+k
t;( k k
t)+1), we draw pseudo random




1   ~ p
)   0g):
From this initial value of kt, we then begin the construction of this particular sample
path. When we get to the period of the second measurement when the child is age t0 > t,
the test score is drawn from a binomial distribution with parameters ( k;p(kt0)) as described
above.
174.3 Identication
In this discussion we indicate the manner in which the behavioral parameters characterizing
the model can be recovered from the data at our disposal in a reasonably straightforward
manner given the requisite data. The estimator we actually implement has several advan-
tages (both theoretical and practical), to be detailed below, over those discussed in this
section. But in a reasonably complex dynamic model it is probably useful to develop some
intuition as to the key sources of identifying information under our modeling assumptions.
We rst consider the estimation of production technology parameters. As noted below,
there are 15 parameters to be determined in our parameterization. Estimation of all
parameters is hampered by the fact that the PSID-CDS data are not collected on a yearly
basis. We employ CDS data that were collected in 1997 and 2002. The timing convention
we use is that the child quality measures observed in year t are generated by year t child
quality, kt: Thus, in 2002 for example, for a child of age t in that year, the measured child
quality and inputs in 2002 map into the child quality measure of 2003. Unfortunately,
that information is unavailable to us. We will carry out our discussion assuming that it is,
and then we will consider how our estimation strategy has been adapted to deal with the
sizable amount of missing data.
If we did have access to the actual level of child quality in successive periods recovery
of the  parameters would be completely straightforward. Say that we had child test score
data for both the years 2003 and 2002, as well as the investment information concurrent
with the 2002 child quality measure. Using the specication given in (13) and substituting
in the functional form of the age-dependent production function parameters, we have
lnki;ti+1 = lnRi;ti + 1;ti ln1;i;ti + 2;ti ln2;i;ti + 3;tiz1t + 4;tiz2t + 5;ti lnei;ti + 6;ti lnki;ti
= 0;0 + 0;1ti + exp(1;0 + 1;1ti)ln1;i;ti + exp(2;0 + 2;1ti)ln2;i;ti
+exp(3;0 + 3;1ti)lnz1;i;ti + exp(4;0 + 4;1ti)lnz2;i;ti
+exp(5;0 + 5;1ti)lnei;ti + exp(6;0 + 6;1ti)lnki;ti + "i;ti;
 X(ti;1;i;ti;2;i;ti;z1;i;ti;z2;i;ti;ei;ti;ki;ti;) + "i;ti; i = 1;:::;N:
where i denotes the household, ti is the age of the child in household i at the time of the
2002 CDS survey, and "i;ti
i:i:d:  N(0;2
R). Then subject to the usual full rank conditions,
the nonlinear least squares estimator




(lnki;ti+1   X(ti;1;i;ti;2;i;ti;z1;i;ti;z2;i;ti;ei;ti;ki;ti;))2: (17)
is a consistent estimator of ; that is, plim^ NLLS = : The \full rank conditions" in this
case primarily means that not all households choose the same values of investments, which
is trivially satised in the data, and that not all households have a child of the same age.
Since the parameters characterizing the production function are a linear function of age, it
18is enough that the sample contain children of two dierent ages for the full rank condition






(lnki;ti+1   X(ti;1;i;ti;2;i;ti;z1;i;ti;z2;i;ti;ei;ti;ki;ti; ^ NLLS))2:
Of course, the argument given above requires that not only are child quality mea-
sures available for two successive years, it also assumes that child quality is observed. As
discussed above, we only observe a test score measure k that allows us to generate a
distribution of values of k given our prior distribution and knowledge of the parameters
characterizing p(k): If we had access to measures k
i;ti+1 and k
i;ti; then the model and the
measurement process imply a mapping between the two distributions that is a function of
the observed inputs at time ti; the measured inputs, and the parameter vector : While
estimates of  could not be recovered simply using the NLLS estimator described in (17),
a method of moments or maximum likelihood estimator could be dened to recover :
In terms of the identication of the wage and income processes, the PSID contains
multiple observations of wages (for those parents who work) and non-labor income over
several periods across the child development process, including periods for which we do not
have child quality data from the CDS. In estimating the nonlabor income process, which is
assumed to be independent of the wage processes, there are no issues. The data generating
process (DGP) for It is described in (14) and (15); under the i.i.d. assumption on the
normally distributed disturbances, this is simply a Tobit, and all that is to be estimated is
the constant term and the variance of the disturbance, which can be done using a maximum
likelihood estimator with cross-sectional data alone.
While we have access to wage observations for multiple periods, wage observations are
nonrandomly missing due to the signicant number of corner solutions associated with
labor supply choices. When one or both parents is not in the labor market, we do not
observe the wage. Under our model specication, we can \correct" our estimator of model
parameters for the nonrandomly missing data using our the DGP structure from the model.
In this case, both the wage processes and the parameters characterizing preferences and
production possibilities must be simultaneously estimated.
Each household, at every point in time, makes seven decisions. The time-invariant
household utility function is characterized in terms of 3 free parameters, since
P4
j=1 j = 1:
Other parameters characterizing preferences that remain to be considered are the discount
7If the production parameters were a quadratic function of child age, then the full rank condition would
require that the sample contain children of at least three dierent ages, and so on.
8Note that if we have observations of child quality and inputs for children of every age, we could
consistently estimate the production function parameters kt, k = 1;:::;6, directly using an OLS regression
of child quality on inputs for each age. The absence of this information for every child age necessitates
some functional form restriction on how these parameters vary by child age.
19rate, ; and the parameter   that, in conjunction with 4; determines the terminal valua-
tion of child quality at this stage of the development process. Both the  and   parameters
are assumed to be homogeneous in the population.
If we condition on values of  and  ; then the marginal distribution of  is nonpara-
metrically identied given only one period of observed input demands, labor supplies, and
total household income per household. To see this, simply note that by the structure of
the production and utility functions, input demands are positive in every period of the
production process. The conditional (on labor supply and household income) demand
functions are given by (7);(8);(9);(10); and (11): Given  and  ; this system of equations
can be inverted to yield unique values of 1; 2; and 3 for each household in the sample.
Then the empirical distribution of these values is the nonparametric maximum likelihood
estimator of G(); with the estimator conditional on estimates of the production function
parameters and values of  and  :
What remains is the determination  and  : Under our assumption of homogeneity of
these parameters, we could use any household in which both parents work, in conjunction
with our estimates of 1;2; and 3 for that household, to determine values of  and  .
This is accomplished by using the labor supply decisions evaluated at the actual hours
choices and wage oers to back these two values out.
While our identication arguments (hopefully) are reasonably convincing at some level,
there remain some conceptual problems. Most obvious is the multiplicity of estimates of
G; ; and   that are available. We have access to two observations on input demands,
household labor supplies, and total income for all households in the subsample that we
utilize. Conditional on a values of  and  ; this means that two separate estimates of the
household  vector are available. There is no possibility that these \backed out" values of
the  vector will be the same at both CDS dates. Of course, one could rationalize input
choices at several points in time by adding classical measurement error to the conditional
demand equations, but adding measurement error is inherently arbitrary and creates other
identication problems.
The main objective of our discussion of identication has been to illustrate that there
is a substantial amount of information regarding preferences and technology available in
the data available to us, even if we have ignored some of the pressing issues of missing data
in carrying out our discussion. There are two problems with missing data in our sample.
One is the gaps in the data that make it impossible to use successive observations on child
quality along with input demands to estimate the production parameters directly, as in
(17). We observe an indication of child quality in in 1997, along with factor demand in
that year, but don't observe an indicator of the outcome of these choices until 2002, ve
years later. In between these dates, input decisions have been made and levels of child
quality have been determined; these input decisions depend on wage and nonlabor income
draws in the intervening years, possible shocks to productivity, etc. The only way to ll in
these holes is to simulate the path of all of the state variables over this period using the
DGP from the model.
20The other type of missing data problem faced involves nonrandom missing data on
wages. As mentioned above, wages have to be generated for the years between the observed
child quality levels in any event.9 But in addition, when one or both parents supply no
time to the market, the wage oer is not observed for the period. This type of selection
is particularly troublesome when preferences are treated as random in the population. In
this case, seeing a parent not supply time to the market is consistent with (1) that parent's
wage oer being low, (2) the household utility function weight on that parent's leisure being
high, or (3) both (1) and (2). In order to \extrapolate" preferences and wages when a large
number of households have at least one parent out of the labor force requires parametric
assumptions on both processes.
The nal identication issue we consider is an extremely important one that is associ-
ated with the measurement of child quality. We consider child quality k to be inherently
unobservable. The law of motion of child quality involves the previous period's level of child
quality, observable inputs in the production technology, a shock (contributed through ran-
dom TFP), and a vector of unknown parameters. In particular, the scale of child quality
is indeterminant. Furthermore, our only direct reading on child quality comes through the
test score k: Our conceptualization of the relationship between the observed test score
and latent child quality contains inherent randomness (through the Binomial distribution)
and is a function of two unknown parameters in the p(k) function. So once again, a scaling
issue arises in this mapping. In order to mitigate the problem of scale indeterminacy, we
decided to restrict both the production technology and the mapping between k and k:
In our estimation, we restrict TFP to be deterministic and constant (equal to 1) in every
period. Thus R = 0; and 00 = 01 = 0: This results in 3 fewer production function
parameters being estimated. Furthermore, for the probability of answering a question on





These restrictions seemed to result in sensible estimates of the primitive parameters and led
to what might be considered plausible degrees of dispersion in the implied k distribution.
Clearly, however, other restrictions could have been imposed that would have resulted in
dierent point estimates and inferences.
4.4 Estimator
The family data we have available consist of a sample households with observed charac-
teristics X and includes children interviewed at various ages, where child age is indexed t.
9While wage and nonlabor income is gathered at every interview date, PSID interviews are conducted
every 2 years at this point, and our decision periods correspond to single years. For this reason, even the
wage and nonlabor income process has to be simulated between the times when the child quality measures
are available.
21The observed household characteristics include parental variables, such as education and
ages of parents at the birth of the child. We observe for each mother and father in the
household, hours worked, hours spent with children (both active and passive), and repeated
measures of child quality. In addition, we observe, (accepted) wages for both parents and
total household income, as described in the Data Section. Although data on some child
specic expenditures are available, we do not utilize them in forming the estimator.10
The family data we utilize to estimate primitive parameters is taken from the CDS
administered in 1997 and 2002 and from the standard questions concerning household
income, wages, and labor supply asked of all adult household members in the PSID. For
each household included in our sample we observe the following information:
Variable Description Survey Years Model Years Source
fh1;t;h2;tg Parental labor supply 1997,1999,2001 1996,1998,2000 PSID
fw1;t;w2;t;Itg Parental wages and nonlabor income 1997,1999,2001 1996,1998,2000 PSID
fk
tg Letter word score 1997,2002 1997,2002 CDS
f1;t;2;t;z1;t;z2;tg Time spent with child by parent 1997,2002 1997,2002 CDS
X Demographic characteristics 1997 1997- PSID
The survey year column refers to the year of the survey from which the information is taken.
The model year column indicates our timing convention regarding this information. The
last column gives the source of the information. So, for example, the parental labor supply
information is taken from the regular PSID survey given in years 1997, 1999, and 2001, and
the information is retrospective (hours per week in the previous year), so that it is taken
to refer to outcomes in 1996, 1998, and 2000, respectively. The demographic information,
containing the (1997) age of the parents and their schooling completion levels, is taken
from the 1997 PSID. Schooling is assumed to be time invariant and age is incremented in
the obvious way.
The estimator is based on simulation. We rst dene a set of sample moments, which
summarize the relationships in the sample at at each survey date and across survey dates.
Let the vector of sample characteristics in our sample of size N be denoted by MN: For
each household i; we generate a set of NS sample paths over the development period in the
following manner. The empirical process begins in 1997 when the child is t0
i years of age in
household i: Given the parent's characteristics at the sample date, X0
i , we draw from the
distribution of shocks to wages and nonlabor incomes, and in conjunction with the \mean
shifters" in X0
i ; we determine the initial wage and income draws. Using the 1997 Letter
Word test score, k; we draw from the distribution of k as described in Section 4.2. The
particular draw of k is an initial condition for this particular sample path. Finally, we also
10The reason for this decision was that the average reports of child-specic expenditures were exceed-
ingly low. Our interpretation was that respondents were not properly attributing some of the household
expenditures on public goods to children. In any case, we think that it is dicult for any person, even an
economist to properly impute these values, and hence did not utilize them when forming the estimator.
22draw from the distribution of household preferences, G(), and this draw stays with the
household over the entire sample path. Since the production technology is assumed to be
deterministic, we can then solve the household's decision problem in 1997, yielding values
of labor supply and investment decisions.
In 1998 we have no observations on child quality or investments, yet using the DGP
we can simulate these values. Since the wage and nonlabor income processes are assumed
to be conditional (on observable characteristics) independently distributed over time, we
draw new wage oers and nonlabor income for 1998. Child quality in 1998 is determined
from child quality in 1997 and the inputs used in 1997. Household decisions for 1998 are
then determined, and we repeat this process through the year 2002. In this manner we
generate a sequence of wage and nonlabor income draws from 1997 through 2002, child
quality realizations (k) in all years, and sequences of all of the other dependent variables
in the model.
For the same household i; this process is repeated NS times, so that in the end we
have NS N sample paths. Using the simulated data set, we then compute the analogous
simulated sample characteristics to those determined from the actual data sample. The
simulated moments generated are determined by 
, the vector of all primitive parameters
that characterize the model, and the actual (pseudo) random number draws made in gen-
erating the sample paths. Denote the simulated sample characteristics generated under the
parameter vector 
 by ~ MNS(
): The Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) estimator of






(MN   ~ MNS;N(
))0W(MN   ~ MNS;N (
));
where W is a symmetric, positive-denite weighting matrix. By the Law of Large Numbers
(LLN), plimN!1MN = M; the population vector of values of the characteristics compris-
ing MN: Since we do not have access to unbiased simulators, for consistency of the MSM es-
timator, we require that NS also grow indenitely large. Let the true value of the parameter
vector characterizing the model be denoted by 
0: Then plimNS!1 ~ MNS;N(
0) = MN(
0):
Given identication and these conditions,
plimN!1;NS!1~ 
NS;N;W = 
 for all W:
The moments we use include the average and standard deviation of child quality at
each child age, the average and standard deviation of hours of work for mothers and
fathers at each child age, and the average and standard deviation of child care hours for
mothers and fathers at each child age. In addition, we use the average and standard
deviation of accepted wages and the correlation in wages across parents. We also compute
a number of contemporaneous and lagged correlations between the observed labor supply,
time with children, child quality, wages, and income. It is important to note that while
we do not observe child inputs, labor supply, wages, and income in the same periods, our
simulation method allows us to tractably combine moments from various points in the child
development process into a single estimator.
234.5 Data
We utilize data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the rst two waves
of the Child Development Supplements (CDS-I and CD-II)). The PSID is a longitudinal
study that began in 1968 with a nationally representative sample of about 5,000 American
families, with an oversample of black and low-income families. In 1997, the PSID began
collecting data on a random sample of the PSID families that have children under the
age of 13 in a Child Development Supplement (CDS-I). Data were collected for up to
two children per family. The CDS collects information on child development and family
dynamics, including parent-child relationships, home environment, indicators of children's
health, cognitive achievements, social-emotional development and time use, among other
variables. The entire CDS sample size in 1997 is approximately 3,500 children residing
in 2,400 households. A follow-up study with these children and families was conducted in
2002-03 (CDS-II).11 These children were between the ages of 8-18 in 2003. No new children
were added to the study.
Starting in 1997, children's time diaries were collected along with detailed assessments
of children's cognitive development. For 2 days per week (one weekday and one weekend
day), children (with the assistance of primary caregiver for very young children) lled out
a detailed 24 hour time diary in which they recorded all activities during the day and
who else (if anyone) participated with the child in these activities. At any point in time,
the children recorded the intensity of participation for parents: mothers and fathers could
be actively participating or engaged with the child or simply around the child but not
actively involved. We refer to the rst category of time as \active" time and the second as
\passive." We construct a weekly measure of active and passive time for the mother and
father by multiplying the daily hours by 5 for the weekday and 2 for the weekend day and
summing the total hours for each category of time.
Children's cognitive skills are conceived broadly to include language skills, literacy and
problem-solving skills and are measured with the Woodcock Johnson Achievement Test-
Revised (Woodcock and Johnson, 1989). In 1997, children aged 3-5 received the Letter-
Word Identication and Applied Problem sub-tests. Children aged 6 and above received
Letter-Word and Passage Comprehension sub-tests as well as Applied Problems and Cal-
culation sub-tests. In the 2002-03 (second) wave, these tests were re-administered, with
the exception of the the Calculation sub-test. Given the wide range of ages to which the
Letter-Word tests was administered, we use this test as our measure of child development.
We use the raw scores on this exam rather than the age standardized exam. The test
11An important addition in CDS-II is a set of detailed questions about childhood consumption. These
questions concern the amount of money the family and others outside of the family unit paid for various
types of the consumption of and the investment in the target child over the previous 12 months. These
items include tuition, tutoring programs, lessons, and sports. There is also a set of questions concerning
the expenditures the family or others outside the family unit make for all the children within the house-
hold. These include toys or presents, vacations, school supplies, food and clothes or shoes. There is also
information on health care and childcare and related care expenses.
24contains 57 items, and the range in the raw scores is 0 to 57.
For each household, we observe hours, hourly wages, and non-labor income during the
1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003 surveys reported for the previous year (1996, 1998, 2000, and
2002). The monetary values have been deated and are all in 2001 USD. All
wage and income information is used in estimating the model, even though child in-
vestment and achievement information is only available in 1997 and 2002-03.
We are interested in households in which both biological parents were present in both
waves. Most of the variables we use in the model are collected from the primary caregiver
of a child and for the head and wife of the household. Therefore, our preliminary sample
consists of children who (1) have valid test scores in both waves of the Child Development
Supplements, and (2) are sons or daughters of the head of the household (94 percent of
the original CDS sample). Because our model pertains to a single child, we drop those
households who have more than one child during the sample period. In addition we drop
observations with missing information on mother's or father's time with the child, those
reporting (real) hourly wages above $150 per hour in any period, and those with weekly
non-labor income above $1,000 in any period. Our total sample consists of 91 intact single
child households.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of our selected sample. At the initial 1997 wave of
the sample, the children are aged 3-12, with the average child age of 6.3 years. In 1997, the
parent's average age is 37.7 for fathers and 34.5 for mothers. Average years of schooling is
similar across parents at about 13 years.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on labor supply, wages, and income. Average
hours worked by fathers is about 30 percent larger than for mothers. Average father's
wages are about 27 percent larger than average mother's wages. Average non-labor income
is about $133 per week and about 64 percent of households have no nonlabor income.
Table 2 provides evidence on the allocation of parental time as the child ages. Mothers
spend almost twice as much active time with the children as fathers when the child is
aged 3-5. This gap in active time largely closes for older children. When the children are
young, both mothers and fathers spend much more of their total child rearing time actively
engaging with the child rather than in passive engagement. For older children, the parents
are spending roughly equal time in passive and active engagement as the amount of active
time declines for both mothers and fathers. Because of the sharp reduction in active time
with the child, the average total time with the child for mothers declines substantially as
the child ages. However, total time the father spends with the child increase slightly, which
is due entirely to an increase in the father's passive time engagement.
Table 3 shows the pattern of mothers and fathers labor supply by child age. There
is little change in the probability of working for mother's or father's as the child ages.
However, average hours worked for mothers who are employed (at least 1 hour in the
labor market) does increase slightly over the period while average hours worked for fathers
declines slightly.
Figure 1 presents the average letter word score by the child's age. The average score
25is about 5 for 3 year old children and rises to about 50 for 14 year old children. Since the
scores are not age-normed, there is a substantial degree of growth, particularly at early
ages. The function attens out due to ceiling eects at the upper ages in the development
period we examine.
5 Estimates
This section begins with a discussion of the estimates of the behavioral model. We then
provide an assessment of within-sample model t. We conclude the section with a number
of \local" comparative statics exercises performed using the point estimates we obtained.
5.1 Household Preference Parameters
Periods are in years and the assumed planning horizon is age 16, T = 16. As discussed
above, parents may continue to make child investments after this point but we do not
explicitly model these investments and rely on our terminal period specication to capture
the utility value of them. The annualized discount rate for the household is xed at
 = 0:95.
Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of the behavioral model in which it is assumed
that parental preferences are time (i.e., child age) invariant, though we allow for population
heterogeneity in preferences. The transformed parameters of the distribution are dicult
to interpret, so instead we present their mean values, standard deviations, and the three
correlation coecients, which taken together describe the (estimated) rst two moments
of the population distribution of preferences under our parametric assumption on this
multivariate distribution. In terms of the average household preference weights, under the
second specication, there is a somewhat higher weight placed on father's leisure than
the mother's (0.17 versus 0.13). The average weight applied to household consumption
is 0.33, and the weight attached to child \quality" is 0.37. The parameter estimates are
mainly attributable to the fact that women spend \too little" time in leisure given the
wage dierences between fathers and mothers and the declining gender dierences in the
productivity of time investments with the age of the child to be consistent with equal
average household preference weights.
Turning next to what the estimates imply about the dispersion of preferences, the pa-
rameter estimates for Model 2 yield standard deviations for the four preference parameters
of between 0.08 and 0.2. The ratio of standard deviation to mean (coecient of variation)
for the preference parameters varies between 0.28 and 0.77, with the relative dispersion
greatest in the preference for mother's leisure. We also estimate a strong correlation in
leisure preferences across spouses, with the correlation in 1 and 2 estimated at 0.5. This
may reect the extent of assortative matching in the marriage market with regard to pref-
erences in leisure. In contrast, we estimate a negative correlation between preferences for
26mother's leisure 1 and household consumption 3, estimated at  0:25, but a positive cor-
relation between father's leisure 2 and consumption 3 at 0:4. These correlations are likely
not representative of the general population (including households with no children and
those with more than one child) but reect the particular sample of single child households
we use to estimate the parameters.
The scaling factor applied to the terminal valuation of child quality ( ) is estimated
to be approximately 43:4. To give some meaning to this number, if we were to assume the
household is innitely lived (as discussed above) and using the assumed discount factor of
 = 0:95, the implied   terminal value on child quality would be (1   ) 1 = 20. Taken
together, our point estimates imply that the household highly values child quality both in
terms of ows and its terminal value, where the termination date here is considered the
end of this particular (sub) development process. The high value of   could indicate that
kT serves as an \important" initial condition for developmental processes that begin in the
later teen years. However, unlike the estimates for the other preference parameters, this
parameter has a relatively high standard error of 29:13. This suggests that it is dicult to
precisely estimate the terminal value of child quality separately from the ow value, given
by the 4.
5.2 Child Quality Technology Parameters
We next discuss the estimated production process for child quality, which we allow to
change in a \smooth" way with the age of the child, as described above. Table 5 provides
the parameter estimates.
Figures 2 and 3 graph the estimated technology parameters from Table 5. Figure 3
shows that the persistence of child quality (6t) is increasing as the child reaches the upper
age limit of our analysis. While we believe that this may reect a real characteristic of the
development process, there is no doubt that it also reects the ceiling eect produced by
our xed interval measure of child quality that is not age-normed.
We see that for three of the time \ow" inputs into the dynamic production process
(mother's active and passive time and father's active and passive time), the productivity
the input changes substantially over the child development process. As expected, mother's
active time is the most productive input for young children, followed by active time of
the father. For young children, passive time from mothers and fathers has much lower
productivity. The productivity of mother's and father's active time is declining with the
child's age. While passive time for the mother stays about the same, the productivity of
passive father's time is actually increasing as the child ages. By the time the child reaches
age 12, we estimate that passive father's time is more productive than active mother's or
active father's time. This change in the productivity of time as the child ages reects the
changing input mix of time revealed in the data. Fathers spend more time with their child
as the child ages and much of this time is of a passive sort.
The declining productivity of active parental time makes some intuitive sense given our
27model specication.
Once children attain the age of 5 or 6, they typically leave the home for signicant
periods of time each day for formal schooling activities. This amounts to a large, probably
discontinuous, shift in the child quality process. Even after the onset of formal schooling
activities, the child may increasingly be subject to inputs, both good and bad, from teachers
and other students, that supplant the interactions the child had previously with the parents.
From the point of view of parental inputs, their input decisions have increasingly small
eects on child outcomes as they are \crowded out" by these others.12 While one could
argue about the form of the dependence of the production process on the age of the child,
it is reasonable to think that the impact of parental inputs is, in general, declining.13
5.3 Wage and Non-Labor Income Process Parameters
Wage oers are unobserved with a distribution that depends on observed household charac-
teristics, including mother's and father's age and mother's and father's education. Table 6
displays the estimated wage and income parameter estimates. We estimate that each year
of schooling for mothers increases her mean log wage oer by around 4.8 percent, and for
fathers, by around 7.8 percent. We estimate a rather at but convex age earnings prole
for these households, rather than a standard concave pattern. This is likely attributable to
the limited age range at which we observe the parents, when parents are aged between 30
and 50. The parameter estimates imply that the mother's mean earnings would increase
by about 14 percent from age 30 to age 45, and about 18 percent for fathers. We estimate
that the innovation/shock process for wage oers for mothers and fathers have substantial
positive correlation at 0.8, which probably reects both that the mother and father are in
a common labor market and assortative marriage matching.
Non-labor income for the household is partially observed for some periods but un-
observed for others. Unlike the wage oer distribution, we do not face the problem of
endogenous non-labor income since we have an observation of non-labor income for each
household. The mean of the latent non-labor income is given by 0
3 and does not depend
on parental characteristics.14 For the latent non-labor income process, we estimate a high
standard deviation in the innovation. There is some imprecision in the estimate of 0
3
intercept but the standard deviation of the shock is quite precisely estimated.
12Of course, the parents continue to have a major impact on the factor inputs through their choice of
the child's schooling environment. Liu et al. (2010) focus on this important aspect of child investment
decisions.
13Several researchers have pointed to the importance of the phenomenon of self-investment as the child
ages (e.g., Monfardini (2008)). The persistence we note in child quality process as the child ages may be
due to the child, and others, supplying inputs that are unobserved and persistent.
14We found that non-labor income is in general unrelated to household characteristics of parents, educa-
tion and age. Hence we model the latent distribution not to depend on these characteristics.
285.4 Within Sample Fit
Table 7 displays the sample t of our simulated model to some features of the wage and
income data. In general, we t the mean and standard deviation of accepted wages and
non-labor income well.
In terms of time allocation, the estimated model is able to t basic patterns in time
with children and labor supply. Table 8 presents the sample t for each of the two types of
parental time and the probability working and hours worked for those who work. Employ-
ment is dened as working any hours during the week of the survey (note any hours during
the year). The model is able to replicate the high employment rates for fathers relative to
mothers, and the higher average hours of work for fathers relative to mothers. In addition,
the model reproduces the increasing average work hours for mothers as their child ages.
However, while the data indicates a slight fall in probability of employment for mothers as
the child ages (from 0.83 to 0.79), the model indicates an increase in employment rates.
Examining, the within sample t of time allocation to children, we see that the model
ts the lower average time fathers spend with their child than mothers. In addition, the
model replicates the declining time mothers spend with children as their children age,
although the estimated model predicts a atter change in active mother's time than in the
sample data.
Figure 4 provides evidence on the sample t of the estimated child quality process to
the observed child quality measure. The estimated model ts well the concave increasing
average level of child quality as the child ages.
5.5 Comparative Statics Exercise: Wage Changes
Next, we probe the predictions of the model at the estimated parameters by performing a
number of comparative statics exercises. A potentially interesting question is how changes
in wages earned by fathers or mothers impact household decisions and outcomes. The
elasticities we compute are \nite" ones. For each period t, we increase the wage draw
for all mothers or all fathers. We then re-simulate the model for each sample household
from the initial child interview in 1997 to the terminal period at age 16, and re-calculate
simulated moments over the data sample and our simulation draws from the estimated
distributions of preferences, wages, non-labor income, and child quality shocks.
Table 9 computes elasticities for mean child quality (at the terminal age of 16), mean
hours worked by both parents, mean time with the children of both parents, leisure of both
parents, child expenditures, parental consumption, and overall household utility. The rst
column provides the baseline levels at the original wage draws. The age 16 child quality
is the terminal value of child quality produced by parental inputs at the last period of
development, age 16, and the current level of child quality at that age.15 We focus on this
15Given our timing convention, where inputs in period t produce child quality in period t+1, the terminal
level of child quality produced from age 16 inputs is k17, with test score measure k

17.
29statistic since the terminal value of child quality seems to be the most policy relevant from
the perspective of producing adult outcomes. This terminal level of child quality is the
initial condition for the child as she transitions to adulthood. We report both the simulated
value of measured child quality on the test score scale of 0 to 57, and the simulated value of
latent child quality, the value that enters the household's utility function and the production
function. The remaining statistics are summary measures over all child ages. For example,
average hours that the mother works under the baseline is the simulation estimate of the
average labor supply for all sample mothers who have children that range in age from 3 to
16. The elasticity estimates indicate that a 1 percent increase in the women's wage oer
would increase average labor supply for mothers by 1.05 percent from baseline (a greater
than unit elastic response).
Our main interest is in the dierence in the responsiveness of each of the variables to
wage changes by gender. Since our main concern is child quality, we begin with the rst two
rows of Table 9. We note that increasing the mother's wage has a positive impact on child
quality. The elasticity of latent child quality to mother's wage is 0.0049, a very inelastic
response. Given the ceiling eect in the test score measure, the elasticity of the measure
child quality is even lower. The net eect of this change depends on preferences over
consumption, parental leisure, and child quality, and various time and expenditures choices.
The remaining rows of the simulation table unpacks the various household responses. As
we see from the fourth row, the mother reduces her active and passive time with the child
as a result of a wage increase. This eect alone would reduce child quality. However,
the higher wage for mothers induces higher labor supply and increases labor income for
the household. With this added labor income, the household optimally increases its child
expenditures. This eect increases child quality. In addition, the increase in the mother's
wage oer changes the relative prices of mother's and father's time, and the father works
less and spends more time with his child. This eect of greater father's time with the child
has a positive eect on child quality. Together these positive and negative eects of an
increase in the mother's wage largely cancel each other out, resulting in a weak inelastic
eect on child quality.
In the next policy experiment (column 3 of Table 9), we increase the father's wage.
An increase in the wage of the father has a stronger eect on nal child quality than an
increase in the mother's wage, but the father's child quality elasticity is still quite inelastic
at 0.0067. Notice that the wage increase for fathers has a smaller negative own eect on
father's labor supply and a stronger positive cross-eect on mother's labor supply through
an income eect. An increase in the father's wage results in the mother spending less time
in the labor market, and this reduction is spread between her increased leisure and increased
time with her child, which results in an improvement in child quality. The increase in the
father's wage also results in a larger increase in labor income and higher child expenditures
than an increase in the mother's wage. However, it should be noted however that given
that fathers have higher average wages, a given increase in the father's wage oer is a larger
wage eect than is that for mother's. This is reected in the higher increase in household
30utility from the increase in father's wage relative to the mother's wage.
5.6 Input Allocations
We investigate the importance of modeling the child development process within a house-
hold framework by considering a number of special cases of our more general model.
5.6.1 Child Quality Maximizing Preferences
In the rst special case, we examine the optimal level of child inputs if we were to assume the
household only has preferences over child quality. The optimal allocation of inputs under
these\child quality maximizing" preferences is given by solving the dynamic household
problem setting the weight on parental leisure and consumption to zero: 1 = 2 = 3 = 0.




subject to the constraints: TT = hjt + jt for j = 1;2 and et = w1th1t + w2th2t + It.
Note that the under these \child quality maximizing" preferences, the household problem
is strictly a static problem as the optimal allocation of inputs to maximize child quality in
each period also maximizes the terminal period T level of child quality.
Table 10 presents the mean level of endogenous choices and nal period (age 16) child
quality under the baseline unrestricted model, with heterogeneous preferences discussed
above, and the restricted child quality maximizing preferences. The rst two rows indi-
cate that measured and latent child quality increases under the child quality maximizing
preferences, with a greater response in latent child quality. With child quality maximizing
preferences, average latent child quality increases by about 1/3, from 11.15 to 15.15. With
these preferences, the parents choose to work in the labor market substantially fewer hours
than under the baseline, and the time spent with their children increases substantially. It is
interesting to note that mothers and fathers still work under the child quality maximizing
preferences and do not spend their entire time endowment on child rearing. This is because
market work funds child goods expenditures, and it is optimal for the parents to continue
working some hours. Even under the child quality maximizing preferences, the relative
specialization of mothers to child rearing and fathers to market work still occurs as moth-
ers continue to spend more time on average with their children than fathers, and fathers
work more than mothers. Even with the lower labor income under the child maximizing
preferences, expenditures on children still increases almost three fold over the baseline. By
denition all of the household's income is spent on child goods.
315.6.2 Selsh Parents Preferences
The next special case we consider is the opposite of the previous one. Here we set household
preferences so that there is no weight on child quality: 4 = 0. With these \selsh parents




subject to the constraints: TT = hjt + l1t for j = 1;2 and ct = w1th1t + w2th2t + It. We
maintain the same distribution of preferences over leisure and consumption as estimated.
These selsh parents preferences imply that parents spend no time with their children
1t = 2t = 0 for all t, and there are no expenditures on child goods et = 0 for all t. As with
the child quality maximizing preferences, the household problem under the selsh parent
preferences is a strictly static problem. These preferences are essentially the preferences
that would prevail for couples without children, although the preference distribution over
leisure and consumption we estimate is for a sample of families that choose to have a child
and may not be representative of single, no child households.
The third column of Table 10 presents the results for the model estimated under these
selsh parent preferences. By denition, child quality, time with children, and expenditures
are zero. The interesting aspect of this special case is the contrast of the labor supply
decision with that for the baseline case. If the parents place no weight on child quality, the
mother and father would both work substantially more hours than under the baseline where
they derive utility from child quality. As a result of the additional labor income and no
child expenditures, household consumption increases. These results suggest that parents
optimally reduce their labor supply in order to invest in child quality through time spent
with their children. With no weight on child quality, parents would spend considerably
more time in the labor market in order to nance their own consumption. The most
substantial change is for women, as their average labor supply when the household puts no
weight on child quality is much closer to that of their husbands (52 vs. 58) than under the
baseline preferences (33 vs 43). Our estimates are in line with the view that a major reason
for gender specialization of time between market work and childcare is due to household
preferences over child quality. Without a preference for children, men's and women's labor
supply would be substantially more similar.
5.6.3 Technology Optimal Allocations
In the third special case we consider, the optimal level of child inputs is determined by the
technology alone. This special case is intended to replicate one of the main approaches to
child investment taken in the current literature, in which the production technology alone
is used to draw inferences about the optimal allocation of child inputs across stages in the
child's development and across dierent types of inputs. Our estimate of the production
technology provides a \selection corrected" estimate of the production technology because
32we jointly estimate the production technology with our model of the endogenous parental
inputs. We can then use the estimated technology to indicate what the optimal allocation
of inputs would be if a social planner were to use this technology to allocate resources
but ignore household preferences and dierential wage oers. The degree to which this
technologically-optimal allocation would dier from the actual allocation parents make
demonstrates the importance of considering the child quality technology jointly within
the household decision context, including preferences, wages, and the non-labor income
processes.
With no resource constraint, we cannot consider the level of inputs using the estimated
production technology alone. Instead we dene the \technology optimal" ratio of inputs as
the ratio of marginal productivities of the inputs in each period. The technology optimal













The dierence between the optimal ratio of inputs chosen by the household in our
unrestricted baseline model and the technology optimal ratio is that the household optimal
allocation takes into account the cost of child investments from foregone parental leisure
and consumption (given by 1;2;3) and the dierential opportunity cost of mother's
and father's time due to dierent wage oers.
Figure 5 displays the optimal ratio of mother's time to father's time with the child
under i) the baseline unrestricted household-optimal model and ii) the technology-optimal
model. For the household optimal model, we plot the mean input choices in our sample at
each child age.
Figure 5 shows that the technology optimal allocation reects the change in productiv-
ity of mothers and fathers as the child ages (Figure 2). The technology optimal allocation
allocates relatively less mother's time to child development than the household optimal
solution. The household optimal allocation takes into account that mothers are less pro-
ductive in the labor market than fathers, and therefore the optimal allocation of time is
for mothers to spend relatively more time with the child than fathers. Both allocations
are downward sloping given that the main time invariant feature of the model is the tech-
nology. Mother's time is becoming increasingly less productive relative to father's time as
the child ages.
Figure 6 repeats the analysis of optimal allocations focusing on another ratio of inputs,
the ratio of mother's time to child good expenditures. The technology optimal allocation of
mother's time to expenditures is several times higher than the baseline household optimal
ratio. This reects the fact that the household optimally allocates a much higher relative
33level of expenditures to the child than would be indicated solely by technological consider-
ations. The household optimally substitutes child goods for mother's time. The technology
optimal solution ignores the fact that mother's time with the child has both an opportunity
cost in terms of foregone leisure for the mother and foregone labor income from mother's
labor supply, and therefore foregone parental consumption and child expenditures. This
dierence is particularly stark when children are young, as the technology alone would
dictate that mothers spend substantially more time raising children than the household
would optimally choose. This dierence declines as the child ages and the productivity of
mother's time falls.
6 Social Policy and Child Development
In this section we consider, in a highly stylized manner, the impact of two social policies on
child development and household welfare. Our entire analysis has been conducted outside
of an equilibrium framework, so the exercises reported here are not to be considered part
of a serious policy analysis. However, given that one could reasonably argue that general
equilibrium eects would tend to attenuate the impacts found here, our exercise might at
least establish some bounds on the potential impacts of these policies on child development.
6.1 Public Schooling
Given that the developmental period we examine covers the age range 3-16, school atten-
dance occurs over most of the period. We have not accounted for this in the model ex-
plicitly, which may arguably have resulted in model misspecication regarding the choice
sets of parents and inputs in the child development process.16 In the United States, most
households with children 5 years of age or less receive minimal (child-related) contributions
from governmental and nongovernmental organizations. At the age of 5 or 6, virtually all
children enter public schooling; within this institutional environment, children and their
parents receive large transfers from state and local governments, primarily in the form of
teachers, administrators, school buildings, books, subsidized meals, etc. Data from the
National Center for Educational Statistics suggests that the average of state expenditures
per pupil (across all grade levels) was approximately 10,000 dollars in 2005. We use this
amount in our exercise, and assume that this translates into a weekly transfer of $192.17
Of course, there are many potential benets of public schooling aside from indirect
transfers to households with school-age children. The most obvious ones are eciency
gains, since there would seem to exist scale economies in the provision of basic education,
16Expanding the set of inputs to include time spent with teachers and others encountered in institutional
settings, along with the monetary contributions made by such actors, is an objective of our current research.
17We have simply expressed the total school year amount as a weekly ow value. Our model with its
conventions regarding decision periods (the year) and measurement units (weeks) does not allow us to
allocate the transfers only to weeks in which school is in session.
34and some studies have pointed to the positive impacts of group interactions when young on
noncognitive skills later in life (while there is a healthy debate concerning the deleterious
eects of classroom overcrowding, few researchers or parents call for class sizes of less
than 10 students). We ignore all of these important arguments for the benets of public
schooling, and here examine only the implications of these indirect transfers for the welfare
of children and households using our modeling framework.
In terms of the household's problem, in our model public schooling simply amounts
to a contribution to e; expenditures on the child. The dierence between this form of
subsidy and a direct transfer of $192 to the household with no restrictions on how it is to
be spent are obvious. Household welfare can never be increased by restricting the manner
in which the transfer is used, whereas child quality could be. Given our functional form
assumptions regarding child quality production, every household spends some money on
child investment goods, e. If without the public schooling subsidy, the household spent
$10 per week on the child, say, then the subsidy takes the household well beyond this level.
In terms of household welfare, the constraint that at least $192 of total household income
be spent on child quality would be a binding one. The household will be better o than
it would be without the transfer, but not as well o as if the transfer were unrestricted.
Child quality could increase appreciably in such a case, however. In contrast, when the
household was already spending more than $192 before receiving the public school subsidy,
the constraint is non-binding. The household will be better o, and a portion of its higher
income will be spent on child quality investment. In this case, the percentage gain in child
quality may not be as large as when the constraint is binding.
Table 11 displays the results from this policy experiment. We computed the results
using the same technique as described above for the wage oer comparative statistics
exercises. Column 2 reports the results from a transfer of income of $192 to each household
for all periods subject to the constraint that at least $192 must be spent on child investment
goods. We see that this policy increases average terminal (latent) child quality by 3.6
percent over the baseline. Given the ceiling on the test score measure of 57, measured
child quality increases by less than 1 percent. Mothers and fathers react to this policy by
reducing their labor supply. This occurs because of the income eect of the increase in
household income. On average, mothers and fathers increase their time spent with their
children, but the average increase is less than the average reduction in labor supply. We
can see then that the reduction in labor supply caused by the income transfer is being
split between greater leisure for the parents and greater time investment in their children.
Child good expenditures increase quite substantially, by almost 30 percent, as a result of the
targeted transfer. Household consumption also increases because of the income transfer,
but far less than the increase in child good expenditures. For unconstrained households,
those households already spending in excess of the required $192 on child goods, this policy
is a pure income transfer.
356.2 Limitations on Work Hours
In France in 2000, the left-wing government of Lionel Jospin passed a law establishing
35 hours as the new legal work week, with strict limits on and penalties for work over
this limit.18 While the rationale for decreasing the length of the work week was not
framed explicitly in terms of child development, such a law could possibly be expected to
have signicant impacts on the child development process, since it directly impacts the
household's ability to freely allocate time and nancial resources across competing uses.
Needless to say, if such a law were to be imposed and seriously enforced in the U.S. context,
we would expect to see potentially major changes in wage distributions, the demand for
capital, etc. These are all neglected in our exercise, where we simply impose a binding
35 hour work limitation on each of the parents and make no other changes to the choice
problem the household faces. We assume that the law is perfectly enforced and permanent.
Table 11 provides the results from this policy experiment in the last column. Under
this policy, average latent and measured child quality increases by less than 1 percent.
Mean hours of work for the mother and father fall precipitously, though by far the greatest
change is for fathers, whose average labor supply falls 22.6 percent. Due to these hours
restrictions, both parents spend more substantially more active and passive time with
their child, on average. Mirroring the labor supply changes, the most substantial increase
is for fathers. Child good expenditures fall 12.8 percent from the baseline because of the
lower labor supply and consequent reduction in labor income. The positive eects of the
increase of parental time spent with the child is almost perfectly countered by the negative
impact of the reduced expenditure on the child. We see from the last row in the table that
household utility drops by a bit more than 3 percent due to the hours restrictions. With a
small positive impact on average child quality, this policy does not seem to have much to
recommend it, at least evaluated in terms of our simple partial-partial equilibrium model.
7 Conclusion
Using a simple dynamic production technology for child quality and a Cobb-Douglas spec-
ication of a household utility function, we employ unique data from the PSID-CDS on
investments in children to recover estimates of the parameters necessary to characterize the
child development process. We view the main message of the paper to be that household
time and money investments in children can only be properly understood when preferences,
technologies, and choice sets are simultaneously considered and estimated. We found that
while the average household attaches a substantial weight to child quality in its utility
function, it is by no means only concerned with the quality of the child. This was made
abundantly clear in the comparative statics exercises and policy experiments. For exam-
ple, we provided quantitative evidence regarding the extent of \crowding out" of household
18The limitations on overtime hours were substantially relaxed by amendments introduced over the period
2004 through 2007.
36investment in children by public investment, in the form of schooling transfers. Though
we have not allowed, at present, for time inputs of teachers and other agents, it is clear
that these factors of production belong in the production function as well, and we can
expect that the time inputs of parents to be supplanted by those of other agents when the
child begins formal schooling. Policy-makers considering changes in the school environment
should be aware of parental responses to changes in schooling inputs or their attempts at
enhancing child welfare are likely to be frustrated.
We were also able to reanalyze the issue of the impact of mother's employment on
their children's development. In the comparative statics exercise in which we increased
mothers' wage oers over the development process, we found essentially no eect on child
quality at the end of the developmental stage we analyze. We were able to trace out the
complicated household substitution patterns that led to this result. Estimates of the child
production technology and household preferences were necessary to carry out this exercise
and to arrive at this conclusion.
We believe that we have uncovered a number of interesting empirical results and in-
terpretations, though obviously much more needs to be done on both the preferences and
technology sides of the model. We mentioned that the set of inputs should be expanded
to include the time and money contributions of teachers, tutors, care-givers, and other
relatives. Our analysis is also limited in the sense that we specify a unitary model to
represent household preferences. We used a household utility function approach to ease
the computational burden and to focus attention on the child quality production func-
tion. We do not consider the specication of a unitary model to be that problematic in
the present context, given the diculty of convincingly estimating individual preferences
with the data available to us. However, it is clear that to include in our analysis single
parent households, a decidedly important objective, it would be necessary to abandon the
household utility function framework for an individual-based objective alternative, and to
modify characteristics of the production technology we have employed here as well.19
Despite the limitations of the analysis, we believe that we have been able to demon-
strate the importance of a variety of parental investment activities in the child development
process, and that we have demonstrated the extent to which these investment activities
respond to dierences in resource constraints and preferences both across households and
over time. While many simplifying assumptions were made in order to ease the compu-
tational burden and make identication more transparent, the model was able to t the
data in a satisfactory manner. We view the results here as a potentially important rst
step in building an equilibrium model of the child development process that can be used
in designing social and family policies to increase average \child quality" while decreasing
its dispersion in the population.
19Our production technology carries the implication that unless both parents supply time to child invest-
ment, the child quality will be zero in all subsequent periods. We would have to modify the production
technology accordingly if we considered households in which one parent supplied no time to the investment
process.
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40Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
1997 PSID-CDS
Mean Std.
Child's age 6.31 2.93
Fraction Male 0.539 0.499
Mother's age 34.50 6.48
Father's age 37.67 8.48
Mother's education 13.63 2.22
Father's education 13.62 2.06
Mean Letter Word raw score 23.89 16.21
Median LW raw score 20
Minimum LW raw score 3
Maximum LW raw score 55
1996-2002 PSID
Mean Std.
Mother's Work Hours per Week 31.31 16.30
Father's Work Hours per Week 44.17 10.45
Mother's Hourly Wage 15.70 10.80
Father's Hourly Wage 19.89 12.26
Non-Labor Income per Week 133.10 213.96
Notes: Sample of intact households (mother and father present in household) with one
child. The top panel statistics are for the year 1997 from the 1997 PSID-CDS. Work hours,
wages, and non-labor income statistics are averaged over all years of PSID data.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997 and 2002 interviews and 1997, 1999, 2001,
2003 PSID core data.
41Table 2: Parent's Time with Child by Child Age











Notes: Sample of intact households (mother and father present in household) with one
child.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997 and 2002 interviews and 1997, 1999, 2001,
2003 PSID core data.
Table 3: Parent's Labor Supply by Child Age
Child Age Mother Father










Notes: Sample of intact households (mother and father present in household) with one
child.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997 and 2002 interviews and 1997, 1999, 2001,
2003 PSID core data.
42Figure 1: Average Letter Word Score by Child Age







































Notes: Sample of intact households (mother and father present in household) with one
child.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997 and 2002 interviews and 1997, 1999, 2001,
2003 PSID core data.
43Table 4: Preference Parameter Estimates
Estimate SE
Mean of 1 0.130 (0.0067)
Mean of 2 0.169 (0.0050)
Mean of 3 0.329 (0.0101)
Mean of 4 0.373 (0.0054)
Std. of 1 0.104 (0.0105)
Std. of 2 0.081 (0.0044)
Std. of 3 0.092 (0.0074)
Std. of 4 0.205 (0.0101)
Correlation of 1 and 2 0.492 (0.109)
Correlation of 1 and 3 -0.254 (0.089)
Correlation of 2 and 3 0.403 (0.088)
  (Terminal Payo to Child Quality) 43.67 (29.13)
44Table 5: Technology Parameter Estimates
Estimate SE
10 (Mother's Active Time intercept) -1.52 (0.028)
11 (Mother's Active Time slope) -0.082 (0.0042)
20 (Father's Active Time intercept) -1.81 (0.055)
21 (Father's Active Time slope) -0.046 (0.0043)
30 (Mother's Passive Time intercept) -2.48 (0.035)
31 (Mother's Passive Time slope) 0.0050 (0.0043)
40 (Father's Passive Time intercept) -2.69 (0.041)
41 (Father's Passive Time slope) 0.042 (0.0052)
50 (Child Expenditures intercept) -3.41 (0.022)
51 (Child Expenditures slope) 0.085 (0.0076)
60 (Last Period's Child Quality intercept) -2.079 (0.065)
61 (Last Period's Child Quality slope) 0.040 (0.0056)
45Figure 2: Estimated Child Development Parameters by Child Age












































δ1t Active Time from Mothers
δ2t Active Time from Fathers
δ3t Passive Time from Mothers
δ4t Passive Time Fathers
Notes: 1t;2t;3t;4t estimated parameters by child age (from Table 5).
46Figure 3: Estimated Child Development Parameters by Child Age




























δ3t Expenditures δ4t Previous Child Quality
Notes: 5t and 6t estimated parameters by child age (from 5).
47Table 6: Wage and Income Parameter Estimates
Estimate SE
Mother's Log Wage Oer
0
1 (Intercept) 1.58 (0.017)
1
1 (Mother's Education) 0.048 (0.0013)
2
1 (Mother's Age) 0.0043 (0.0004)
3
1 (Mother's Age Sq x 1000) 0.12 (0.018)
1 (Standard Deviation of Innovation) 0.044 (0.032)
12 (Correlation with Father's Wage Shock) 0.729 (0.018)
Father's Log Wage Oer
0
2 (Intercept) 1.37 (0.023)
1
2 (Father's Education) 0.078 (0.0016)
2
2 (Father's Age) 0.0082 (0.0006)
3
2 (Father's Age Sq x 1000) 0.042 (0.017)
2 (Standard Deviation of Innovation) 0.755 (0.058)
Latent Non-Labor Income
0
3 (Intercept) -50.81 (35.31)
3 (Standard Deviation of Innovation) 397.74 (33.07)
48Table 7: Sample Fit for Wages and Income
Data Simulated
Avg. Mother's Wage 15.70 15.89
Std. Mother's Wage 10.82 10.08
Avg. Father's Wage 19.89 19.75
Std. Father's Wage 12.28 12.14
Avg. Non-Labor Income 133.10 133.10
Std. Non-Labor Income 213.96 213.96
Fraction with 0 Non-Labor Income 0.637 0.651
Notes: Data is actual data from sample of intact households (mother and father present
in household) with one child. Simulated is the model prediction at estimated parameters
given above.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997 and 2002 interviews and 1997, 1999, 2001,
2003 PSID core data.
49Table 8: Sample Fit of Mother and Father's Time Allocation by Child Age
Probability Work > 0 Hours
Mother Father
Child Age Data Simulated Data Simulated
3-5 0.831 0.829 0.985 0.996
6-8 0.829 0.851 0.991 0.9995
9-11 0.862 0.866 0.977 0.998
12-15 0.794 0.880 0.985 0.997
Hours Worked if Work (Avg.)
Mother Father
Child Age Data Simulated Data Simulated
3-5 30.67 30.69 51.53 45.13
6-8 35.91 30.52 50.81 44.98
9-11 36.63 30.93 42.67 45.12
12-15 34.67 35.60 48.20 43.89
Active Time (Avg.)
Mother Father
Child Age Data Simulated Data Simulated
3-5 32.65 26.39 17.91 17.04
6-8 20.86 18.76 15.59 14.42
9-11 19.45 17.15 12.59 13.40
12-15 16.12 17.82 12.55 16.46
Passive Time (Avg.)
Mother Father
Child Age Data Simulated Data Simulated
3-5 16.40 12.80 7.90 8.94
6-8 12.65 12.85 10.25 10.72
9-11 13.83 14.04 10.45 11.93
12-15 17.99 20.57 15.25 20.70
Notes: Data is actual data from sample of intact households (mother and father present
in household) with one child. Simulated is the model prediction at estimated parameters
given above.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997 and 2002 interviews and 1997, 1999, 2001,
2003 PSID core data.
50Figure 4: Simulated and Actual Average Letter Word Score by Child Age
































Notes: Data is actual data from sample of intact households (mother and father present
in household) with one child. Simulated is the model prediction at estimated parameters
given above.
Source: PSID-CDS combined sample from 1997 and 2002 interviews and 1997, 1999, 2001,
2003 PSID core data.
51Table 9: Comparative Statics
Level at Increase Increase
in Mother's Wage in Father's Wage
Baseline Elasticity
Mean Measured Child Quality (Age 16) 51.99 0.0005 0.0007
Mean Latent Child Quality (Age 16) 11.15 0.0052 0.0068
Mean Hours Work (Mother) 33.02 1.052 -1.023
Mean Hours Work (Father) 43.32 -0.59 0.59
Mean Active Time w/ Child (Mother) 19.39 -0.49 0.49
Mean Active Time w/ Child (Father) 15.76 0.39 -0.39
Mean Passive Time w/ Child (Mother) 16.76 -0.49 0.49
Mean Passive Time w/ Child (Father) 15.43 0.39 -0.39
Mean Leisure (Mother) 42.84 -0.40 0.38
Mean Leisure (Father) 37.49 0.36 -0.36
Mean Child Expenditures 241.25 0.40 0.57
Mean Household Consumption 1,325 0.39 0.59
Mean Utility { 0.13 0.19
Notes: This table reports elasticity estimates from an increase in mother's (2) and father's
wage oer (3). Mean Measured Child Quality (Age 16) is the average level of measured
child quality (test score on scale of 0 to 57) at the end of age 16 or the start of period
t = 17, k
17. Mean Latent Child Quality (Age 16) is the latent value of child quality at the
end of age 16 or the start of period t = 17, k17.
52Table 10: Optimal Decisions with Alternative Preferences
Level at Child Quality Selsh Parent
Baseline Maximizing Preferences Preferences
Mean Measured Child Quality (Age 16) 51.99 53.41 0
Mean Latent Child Quality (Age 16) 11.15 15.15 0
Mean Hours Work (Mother) 33.02 8.33 51.82
Mean Hours Work (Father) 43.32 17.73 57.53
Mean Active Time w/ Child (Mother) 19.39 56.86 0
Mean Active Time w/ Child (Father) 15.76 49.56 0
Mean Passive Time w/ Child (Mother) 16.76 46.81 0
Mean Passive Time w/ Child (Father) 15.43 44.71 0
Mean Leisure (Mother) 42.84 0 60.18
Mean Leisure (Father) 37.49 0 54.47
Mean Child Expenditures 241.25 672.13 0
Mean Household Consumption 1,325 0 2,139
Notes: Child Quality Maximizing Preferences set the preference weight on parental leisure
and consumption to 0: 1 = 2 = 3 = 0. Under these preferences, the household
then maximizes the level child quality, and consumption ct = 0 for all t. Selsh Parent
Preferences set 4 = 0, and the household puts no weight on child quality. With these
preferences, all child inputs equal 0 for all t. Mean Measured Child Quality (Age 16) is the
average level of measured child quality (test score on scale of 0 to 57) at the end of age 16
or the start of period t = 17, k
17. Mean Latent Child Quality (Age 16) is the latent value
of child quality at the end of age 16 or the start of period t = 17, k17.
53Figure 5: Optimal Ratio of Mother's and Father's Active Time with Child under Dierent
Modeling Assumptions





















































Baseline Household Optimal Ratio
Notes: Technology Optimal is the optimal ratio of active time with mother versus active
time with father given by the technology alone: 1t=2t. Household Optimal is the average
input choices of the household under the full unrestricted model: 1t=2t.
54Figure 6: Optimal Ratio of Mother's Time with Child and Child Expenditures under
Dierent Modeling Assumptions




























































Baseline Household Optimal Ratio
Notes: Technology Optimal is the optimal ratio of active time with mother versus household
expenditures on child goods given by the technology alone: 1t=5t. Household Optimal is
the average input choices of the household under the full unrestricted model: 1t=et.
55Table 11: Policy Simulations
Experiment (1) (2)
Level at Child Expend. Hours Ceiling
Baseline Floor e  $192 h1t  35
& Inc. Transf. and h2t  35
of $192
Percentage Change from Baseline
Mean Measured Child Quality (Age 16) 51.99 0.36 0.08
Mean Latent Child Quality (Age 16) 11.15 3.64 0.77
Mean Hours Work (Mother) 33.01 -7.40 -15.97
Mean Hours Work (Father) 43.34 -6.24 -22.62
Mean Active Time (Mother) 19.39 4.02 8.92
Mean Active Time (Father) 15.76 4.73 13.45
Mean Passive Time (Mother) 16.76 4.30 9.02
Mean Passive Time (Father) 15.43 4.97 11.76
Mean Leisure (Mother) 42.84 2.20 4.74
Mean Leisure (Father) 37.48 3.18 15.66
Mean Child Expenditures 241.26 29.57 -12.77
Mean Household Consumption 1,326 3.17 -20.35
Mean Utility { 3.54 -3.21
Notes: Experiment 1 gives each household an income transfer of $192 each week and forces
the household to spend at least $192 on child goods. Experiment 2 imposes a labor supply
ceiling on the parents and forces mothers and fathers to work 35 or fewer hours each week.
Mean Measured Child Quality (Age 16) is the average level of measured child quality (test
score on scale of 0 to 57) at the end of age 16 or the start of period t = 17, k
17. Mean
Latent Child Quality (Age 16) is the latent value of child quality at the end of age 16 or
the start of period t = 17, k17.
56